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Abstract
This paper gives both theoretical arguments and econometric support to the notion of optimal FDI
levels, from the viewpoint of human-capital formation in the host country. The optimality of a limited FDI
level depends on the local incentives to get trained. Those incentives are formed in the face of uncertainty
and asymmetric information between the multinational and its potential workers. Our estimates conrm
the signicance of a negative, non-linear impact of FDI per capita on tertiary schooling, both in developed
and developing countries.
1 Introduction
The motivation for this paper comes from an analogy. That analogy links the perspective of developing
countries on skilled migration with the incentives provided there by FDI. Both cases are perceived by the
labor force in developing countries as an opportunity to improve their standards of living and their working
conditions. Moreover, in order to access the pool of skilled migrants or the sta¤ of reputed multinationals,
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these workers often need to qualify as educated labor force.1 Even when not all of them will e¤ectively migrate
or work for a multinational, both realities induce on these workers an e¤ort of human-capital formation with
signicant spillovers for the rest of their countries.
Furthermore, in order for the LDCs to take full advantage of such e¤ort, the emigration quotas and
the magnitude of the FDI inows must provide the population with the right incentives, which will nally
depend on the e¤ective size of such quotas and the actual likelihood of being hired by the multinationals.
Our framework tries to shed some light on the conditions of optimality for FDI inows from the point of view
of human-capital formation in the receiving economy. To that purpose, we are inspired by the literature on
optimal emigration quotas (Mountford (1997), Docquier and Rapoport (2007), etc), though our empirical
subject of analysis is well di¤erent and our theoretical approach also requires some specic features.
In principle, it is straightforward to understand that more FDI and better conditions of employability at
higher wages should stimulate more human-capital formation in order to be selected by multinationals. That
is, the relation between FDI inows and educational investment is monotonically increasing in the context
of a homogeneous local population. However, once we introduce some ability-heterogeneity among natives,
di¤erentiating the most from the least inherently capable workers, such relation becomes non-monotonic.
Since a very large FDI sta¤ implies a very high likelihood to be employed for the high-ability natives, they
will tend to reduce their e¤ort if multinationals hire many people. And the lower e¤ort by the most capable
will be accompanied (as a reaction) by more laziness by all others.
Therefore, and given that the multinationals will eventually learn about the relative productivity of the
sta¤ and release most of the initially unskilled hirings, it may be in the interest of the host country to limit
the number of such hires to raise the human capital of unskilled workers. Especially because they will be
redeployed again in the rest of the economy after working for a foreign a¢ liate. In other words, we suggest
1Abundant empirical studies suggest that multinational corporations tend to raise the demand for education in developing
countries, as their plants are often more skilled-labor-intensive than the rest of the economy (see, for instance, Feenstra and
Hanson (1997)).
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that the above-mentioned relation between FDI per capita and schooling in LDCs has an inverted-U shape
due to a clearly non-linear component, which implies the existence of an optimal FDI per-capita inow from
such perspective.
There is in principle no reason to expect that the multinational corporations will tend to maximize the
aggregate e¢ ciency units of the local human capital. That may not be the case even when such corporations
are interested in the skill composition of their labor force, because there are also many other productive
and strategic priorities for them. Therefore, it may be in the interest of the local government to use some
instruments in order to internalize these external e¤ects, which will spill over all the productive sectors.
Of course, human-capital accumulation is not the only priority to be taken into account by the government
in the host country . Productive linkages with local sectors, technology transfer, etc. may be even more
signicant (see e.g. Markusen and Venables (1999)). Nevertheless, we tried to emphasize the potential non-
monotonicity of the above-mentioned relation, together with some causal explanations for that seemingly
conrmed nding.
On the other hand, Ho¤mann (2003) explored in a two-country, general-equilibrium model the mechanics
of the two-way causality between human-capital accumulation in LDCs and FDI. He considered homogeneous
labor forces in terms of inherent abilities, and two di¤erent factors of production: skilled and unskilled labor,
so that a considerable stock of skilled labor was required by multinationals to invest in the LDC. In contrast
to his paper, in our model we take for granted the existence of some foreign inward investment under all
circumstances, and the existence of labor-force heterogeneity (within the same factor of production) generates
incentives to accumulate more or less human capital at the local level.
Our empirical estimates conrm the signicance of both a positive, linear impact of FDI on tertiary
schooling, and of a negative impact of FDI2, both in developed and developing countries. This fact will
allow us to measure the optimal FDI per capita in a representative country, and o¤er policy recommendations
to the countries on each side of the curve. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to incorporate
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a non-linear e¤ect of FDI in the analysis of human capital accumulation. Zhuang (2008) used a di¤erence-in-
di¤erences approach in which the reverse-causality problem was addressed using dummies of policy changes
as independent variable, instead of FDI measured in dollars. On the other hand, Checchi et al. (2007)
used explicitly an FDI variable as regressor, but only captured its positive linear e¤ect on human capital
formation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes an illustrative model; sections 3 and 4
present the data and the estimation procedure; section 5 yields the results and section 6 contains an appendix
listing the countries in our sample.
2 The Model
In our model the whole country, and not only the hired population, should benet from the induced incentives
generated by FDI. Therefore, there must be some element of uncertainty in the eligibility of potential
candidates for a job. Otherwise the gains would be circumscribed to people who were initially qualied for
their task. Therefore, some noise in the educational (or the political) system of the recipient country must
play here a role, by preventing the rm from adopting a fully-informed recruiting policy.2
That same noise must be also responsible for some uncertainty on the part of the applicants. The less
capable applicants would try to take advantage of the legal, procedural or political loopholes of the system,
which are known by all of them only to the extent of assigning certain probabilities to some events.
2.1 Education as an instrument to be hired by multinationals
Our theoretical framework is a variation of Lazear and Rosen (1981)s model of tournaments. This par-
ticular setting is meant to capture some crucial elements: the risk of selecting an inappropriate sta¤ by
2 In that respect, our model slightly resembles Stark et al. (1997)s paper, though their article focuses on the literature of
the migratory brain drainvs brain gain.
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the corporation; the subsequent incentives to make an e¤ort that such reality induces on both skilled and
unskilled individuals; and the consequent existence of an optimal FDI inow from the point of view of the
local human-capital formation.
Let us denote by l the aggregate population of our host country. The total size of the population is
divided into a proportion 1=2 of high-ability types (let us call them type-2) and a proportion 1=2 of low-
ability types (type-1). The former own  e¢ ciency units of labor ( > 1), whereas the latter own just one
e¢ ciency unit. However, the type of each individual is not observable to the employer. He needs to perform
a selection process in order to choose the (presumably) best employees for the multinational rm, though
such selection depends on an imperfect test.
Let the personal outcome of any individual i in that test depend on his own training e¤ort (ei) and an
element of randomness (i), where the random variable i follows an uniform distribution over the interval
[ a; a], a > 0 8i. More specically, let us denote by gi the test score of individual i and assume that
gi = ei + i (1)
That randomness (i) obscures the true type of the individual to the eyes of the employer, given that a
good (or a bad) result in the test could be obtained (under di¤erent circumstances) by any of the two types.
We can interpret the variance of i as an inverse measure of the quality of the educational system in the
considered country. The magnitude of such variance is measured by the parameter a.
Despite the imperfections in the test, the multinational rm decides to recruit the best h scores, where h
stands for the size of the local sta¤ in the multinational corporation. That variable (h) will also determine
the relative incentives of both types to get educated and, subsequently, the ex-post quality of the hired sta¤.
The way to be selected in the test is beating at least l   h competitors, where l is the total number
of candidates involved in the selection process. All workers will be interested in applying for a job in the
multinational, given that the latter o¤ers a wage higher than the one available locally (wF  wH = 4w > 0,
where F and H stand for "foreign" and "home", respectively).
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First of all, it is intuitive that - given identical preferences (in the form of disutility) with respect to
e¤ort - the high-ability types will exhibit a higher incentive to acquire education, since they will enjoy the
same wage gap, but applied to a higher number of e¢ ciency units of labor. Let us start showing this fact
by obtaining the probability that any worker (of type i) gets a higher score than another worker (of type j):
P (gi > gj) = P
 
ei + i > ej + j

= P
 
i   j
rij
> ej   ei
!
=
Z 2a
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1
4a
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1
2
  (ej   ei)
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
(2)
where we have considered an uniform, independent probability distribution for i and j (we have also
assumed that a is big enough to ensure that probabilities are always positive and lower than one). Let us
denote by  the parameter measuring the intensity of the e¤ort disutility by both types of individuals. Now
we are ready to face the maximization problem faced by the individuals of both types:
Maxe2 Welfare2 =
n
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We have denoted by pi the probability that an agent has a higher score than another one, conditional
on the type (i = 1; 2) of the former. In (3) we are incorporating the fact that, in order to be hired by
the multinational, any candidate must defeat other (l   h) potential workers. Therefore, by plugging the
equations in (4) into the maximands given by (3) and taking the corresponding rst-order conditions, we
come up with the following reaction functions:
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Let us denote by z the term (e2   e1), so that p2 = p1 + z4a . If we now subtract both terms in (5), we can
characterize the distance between the optimal e¤orts made by both types as follows:
z = (l   h) 4w
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Furthermore, we can close the system by imposing a consistency requirement, which guarantees that the
workersexpectations are rational: the e¤ective size of the sta¤must be equal to the sum of the probabilities
to be hired. That requirement can be expressed as follows:
h =
l
2
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pl h1 + p
l h
2

=
l
2
"
1
2
+
z
8a
l h
+

1
2
  z
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l h#
Therefore, our whole system can be characterized by the following pair of non-linear equations in z and h:8<: z = (l   h)
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2.2 Calibration and diagrammatic results
Since the system of equations expressed by (6) has no analytical solution, we need to solve it numerically
for some plausible values of the parameters. In particular, we have followed Ghosh and Whalley (1998)s
parameterization with respect to the units-term in the disutility of e¤ort function ( = 1). Goldin and Katz
(1999) suggest an average return to each year of college in the USA of 0.13 (year 2000), which amounts to a
lower bound for  = 1:52:Finally, our results are not signicantly sensitive to the choice of a, as long as this
parameter value guarantees interior probabilities. We have chosen a = 15 and l = 1.
Since we are interested in the empirical implications of our numerical results, we have included in the
horizontal axis a variable called FDI that can be dened as follows:
FDI  h (4w) (7)
That denition means that there is free entry of foreign direct investors until prots completely disappear.
Moreover, we have normalized (without loss of generality) the native wage wH to zero. Such expression (7)
also implies that FDI and 4w follow an increasing relation, which conforms with the positive correlation
found by Feenstra and Hanson (1997) in the Mexican data.
A second useful denition is
HC  1
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which refers to the aggregate stock of human capital accumulated in the economy as a result of the FDI
inows.
As a result, we can observe in the gure how the Aggregate E¤ort Level ( HC) reaches a peak for an
interior value of FDI (and of the wage gap 4w).
2.3 Interpretation of the gure
Higher wage gaps and FDI inows are likely to induce additional training on the part of both high-ability
and low-ability workers. However, as we know, the incentives are in principle stronger for the most capable
people, given their extra units of e¤ective labor, which translates into a higher wage per hour. That is the
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reason why, as FDI starts to reach signicant values, the aggregate units of e¤ort grow substantially and
skilled workers increase their e¤ort at a faster rate. By e¤ort we mean here training and human-capital
acquisition out of the job.
That situation will only last up to a certain point. When FDI (and the wage gap) is already quite
high and multinationals hire most of the population, skilled types start to feel that the relative gains from
additional e¤ort are lower than their disutility. When they eventually decide to relax, everybody will also
decide to do so.
Therefore, even when the rst and fourth panels show us that the local government may consider subsi-
dizing FDI as much as possible, because local welfare grows faster than rm losses, such government may as
well wonder:
"Should we subsidize FDI so much, when that is nally reducing the educational achievement of our
workers, and the corporations will end up releasing many uneducated, unskilled employees to the rest of the
economy?".
In terms of the gure, the government may wonder whether FDI = 2:5 is better for the economy than
FDI = 4.3
3 Data
We use data from the World Banks World Development Indicators.4 The data cover 167 countries, for the
years 2000 and 2005. Based on the IMF country classication there are 28 developed and 139 developing
countries in the data. Table 1 reports summary statistics of our main variables of interest, for the year 2005.
3When we considered higher values of FDI and 4w, given our parametrization we observed several "hills" and "valleys"
along the evolution of HC in the graph. This fact could allow us to study how some countries are "trapped" in a low-level of
human capital that subsequent additions of FDI may only deteriorate. Only a very signicant push in FDI may draw these
countries out of the trap.
4<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> accessed March/25/2011.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 2005
All Developed Developing
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Literacy rate 82.0 20.00 98.1 1.91 78.8 20.43
Schooling years 12.2 3.19 16.2 1.50 11.4 2.81
Secondary education 61.6 27.74 89.8 6.49 55.9 26.89
Tertiary education 27.7 24.9 61.9 17.32 20.8 20.13
FDI (Bill. USD) 10.2 31.99 36.3 64.72 5.07 16.04
FDI per capita (1000USD) 0.730 1.4241 1.859 2.4399 0.506 0.9898
GDP (per capita) 8354.2 12527.32 31745 13235 3709.2 4835.14
Expenditure on education 15.2 5.11 12.9 3.16 15.7 5.31
Pupil-Teacher ratio 27.0 14.88 14.7 4.01 29.5 15.04
Mortality rate 35.7 33.38 4.2 1.11 42.0 33.15
Land (1000 sq. km) 740.2 1961.00 1072.9 268.58 674.2 1787.99
Observations 167 28 139
Source: Authorscalculation, WDI data.
The variables secondary and tertiary education represent the gross enrollment ratio, which is the ratio
of total enrollment regardless of age to the whole age group which o¢ cially corresponds to the relevant
education level. These, as well as the literacy rate, are expressed in percentage points. For example, about
90% of the population aged 1618 in developed countries are enrolled in some sort of high school.
FDI is the net ow of Foreign Direct Investment in billions of current USD. We also dene FDI-PC which
is FDI (in billions of USD) divided by the population (in millions); therefore, the FDI per capita, FDI-PC,
is dened in thousands of current USD.
GDP per capita is also expressed in current USD. It is evident from the table that GDP per capita in
developed countries is almost ninefold that in developing countries. Mortality rate is expressed in percentage
points; and it is worth noting that in developing countries this is ten times higher than in developed countries.
Finally, Land is the countrys total area excluding water bodies, i.e., lakes and major rivers. This is
expressed in thousands of squared-Km.
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4 Estimation
One of the main testable hypotheses suggested by our theoretical analysis is that the increase in foreign
direct investment in a country induces an increase in the human capital of the country, exemplied by higher
participation rates in higher education, but at a decreasing rate. Eventually, exceeding some (high) level of
FDI, this will start inducing a decline in schooling attainment. To test this hypothesis we run the following
regression by OLS
HCi = + 1FDIi + 2FDI
2
i + Xi + "i (8)
where HCi, signifying human capital, is either the enrollment rate in tertiary education or the enrollment
rate in secondary school in country i:We also consider the overall average years of schooling as a measure of
human capital; this, however, is not the best measure of human capital because of its inability to distinguish
between primary or advanced levels of schooling. Besides, we do not have previous (for the year 2000) levels
of average schooling, which does not facilitate a comprehensive estimation of the relationship regarding this
variable.5 FDIi represents the per capita FDI in country i; in thousands of USD. "i is the error term.
Other control variables are included in the vector Xi for country i. These control for macro variables in
the economy, like GDP per capita, which is probably correlated with education outcomes as we expect richer
countries to have more resources allocated to education; also they control for education input variables, like
the log of public expenditure on education (per capita), the pupil-teacher ratio, the mortality rate, and a
dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if country i is a developed country.
In the study of schooling, researchers generally include variables about education inputs. Two major
measures of education inputs are the pupil-teacher ratio and the public expenditure on education. The
pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school divided by the number of primary
school teachers. The public expenditure on education is the government spending on educational institutions
5This simply means that we will not be able to carry out the proxy-variable estimation for this variable as it will become
clear shortly.
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(private and public) and educational activities (administration, subsidies, students, etc...). As all these are
believed to a¤ect education outcomes in a country, it is necessary to control for them in the regression
analyses in order not to confound their e¤ect with that of the FDI levels in the country.
Mortality rate is included in the regression because it conveys some information about poverty (as mor-
tality rate is higher in poorer countries), but also this may a¤ect educational choices: educational attainment
is an investment decision, the return of which depends on the life-span [see Grossman (2005), Checchi, De
Simone, and Faini (2007)].
4.1 Endogenous FDI
Although we believe that changes in the levels of FDI in some country a¤ect the levels of education in that
country, it is also equally convincing that the current levels of education a¤ect FDI: Foreign companies
might be attracted to invest in countries with higher potential, exemplied by a more skilled (educated)
labor force. There also exist theoretical models that conrm this intuition of reverse causality between FDI
and human capital (see Ho¤man 2003). Therefore, FDI is suspected to be an endogenous variable in our
main equation of interest. To show this, assume that
"i = zi + i (9)
where i is a white noise (homoskedastic, serially uncorrelated error term) that is independent of variables
included in the model, particularly FDI and FDI2: And zi stands for possible variables that are omitted
from the regression, because they are either not available or unobservable, that might be correlated with our
variable of interest, namely FDI: If that is the case, then our OLS estimates of equation 8 will be biased
and inconsistent.
To address this concern we use two di¤erent methods. First, to control for zi; the unobservable variables
in the error term that may be correlated with FDI; we include a proxy variable. This variable, if not exactly
zi; has to be related to it. We choose the lag of the dependent variable as a proxy variable in our analyses.
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For example, in the case of tertiary enrollment, we include in the regression an additional variable which is
tertiary enrollment in the year 2000, recalling that our analyses focus on the year 2005. The inclusion of
such a variable controls for di¤erences between the countries in our cross-sectional data, that could not be
otherwise captured by our included variables. The same idea applies for the other measure of human capital,
secondary enrollment.
The second approach that we use is the instrumental variables approach (two stage least squares, 2SLS).
The idea is to capture the part of FDI that is orthogonal to zi; and measure its e¤ect on the human capital
measure. To do that we use the overall population density, dened as the number of residents per one square
kilometer, as an instrument for FDI. In our sample we nd that the correlation coe¢ cient between FDI
per capita and population density is about 0.45, conrming its relevance here. On the other hand, it is not
very likely that land area has an e¤ect on the level of education in a country, or an e¤ect on the individual
choice of investment in education, lending support to the exclusion restriction,which simply means that
the population density is not part of, or is not correlated with, the variables included in zi: The use of a
valid instrument allows us to estimate dFDI by running the following (rst stage) regression by OLS:
FDIi = 0 + 1Xi + 2Densityi + !i (10)
where Densityi is the population density in country i:We then use the predicted dFDI in the main regression
instead of FDI (the second stage).
One nal point worth emphasizing is that we have in our main regression the variable FDI2 also. If
FDI is deemed endogenous as discussed above, then it follows that FDI2 is also endogenous (essentially,
any function of an endogenous variable is also endogenous). One will be tempted to use dFDI2 instead of
FDI2 in the second stage estimation. However, this is not correct, econometrically speaking.6 Therefore, to
get an instrument for FDI2 we use a nonlinear form of the variables included in the rst stage, and calculate
6Actually, this approach is referred to as the forbidden regression, in the econometric literature. See Wooldridge (2002)
for more details.
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Table 2: The E¤ect of FDI on Secondary Enrollment
OLS Proxy IV
FDI per capita 4:899
(2:08)
3:492
(2:07)
 1:600
( :15)
(FDI per capita)2  :573
( 2:13)
 :492
( 2:56)
0:037
(:03)
ln (GDP per capita) 3:003
(1:95)
0:192
(:17)
5:059
(1:49)
ln (Public Expenditure)  :777
( 1:40)
 :748
( 1:88)
 :237
( :25)
Pupil-Teacher Ratio  :512
( 4:40)
 :238
( 2:75)
 :513
( 4:40)
Mortality Rate  :367
( 5:80)
 :185
( 3:83)
 :350
( 5:17)
Developed Country 1:567
(:40)
 3:046
( 1:08)
0:867
(:20)
Secondary enrollment 2000 0:514
(11:39)
R2 0.81 0.90 0.79
Observations 164 161 164
NOTE. t-statistics in parentheses. * is signicant at the 10% signicance level, ** at
the 5%, and *** at the 1%. Developed Country is a dummy variable that takes on
the value 1 if the country is developed and 0 otherwise. See text for details.
dFDI2 as follows:
FDI2i = 0 + 1Xi + 2Densityi + 3 dFDI2i + i (11)
where dFDI2i is simply the square of the predicted values in regression (10). The regression in (11) will give
us the predicted value of FDI2; or dFDI2; which we will use instead of FDI2 in our main regression.7
5 Results
Table 2 shows the main results of our analyses for the secondary enrollment ratio. It shows results from
the naive OLS estimation, the proxy-variable estimation, and the instrumental-variables estimation. The
dependent variable in all regressions is the secondary enrollment ratio.
The rst column reports the simple OLS regression of secondary enrollment against the relevant variables.
7Note that, for symmetry, we use the same variables in the rst stage of both FDI and FDI2; namely X; Density; and
dFDI2:
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It is evident from the table that GDP has a positive and signicant e¤ect on school enrollment. As expected,
the pupil-teacher ratio and the mortality rate have a negative and very signicant e¤ect on school enrollment.
The sign of the coe¢ cient of public expenditures on education is counterintuitive, nonetheless it is not
statistically di¤erent from zero in this regression.
The most interesting nding in this table is that FDI has the quadratic e¤ect on secondary school
enrollment, conrming our theoretical model. A positive 1 and a negative 2;
8 point to the fact that the
schooling-FDI relationship can be described by an inverted U-shape graph.
The second column is an OLS regression that uses a lagged dependent variable, namely secondary en-
rollment in 2000, as a proxy for the unobservable variables in the error term that a¤ect current enrollment
and maybe related to FDI: Results from this regression are similar to these from the OLS regression, and
also conrm the inverted U-shape relationship between schooling and FDI:
The last column reports the two-stage-least-squares regression output for secondary enrollment. Although
the expected, positive e¤ect of GDP and negative e¤ect of mortality rate and pupil-teacher ratio is once again
conrmed, the FDI coe¢ cients are not statistically signicant anymore (and their signs are counterintuitive).
Table 3 reports the analog results for tertiary enrollment. All estimation results point to the important
observation that an inverted-U shape captures the relationship between FDI and tertiary enrollment.
Other variables, excluding public expenditure on education, also receive coe¢ cients with the right in-
tuitive sign, and are statistically signicant. The instrumental variables estimation results (column 3) are
now very statistically signicant with the right signs. Table 4 reports results for the case of average years of
schooling. As discussed earlier, this variable is more problematic measure of human capital, and a signicant
relationship is not expected in this case.
Both OLS and IV estimates of the e¤ect of FDI on the average years of schooling are not statistically
signicant, although the sign of the IV estimates is in line of our previous results. Also, as mentioned
8These are the coe¢ cients of FDI and FDI2; respectively. See the previous section about the estimated relationship.
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Table 3: The E¤ect of FDI on Tertiary Enrollment
OLS Proxy IV
FDI per capita 3:940
(1:37)
2:027
(1:59)
34:527
(2:08)
(FDI per capita)2  :448
( 1:38)
 :154
( 1:07)
 3:997
( 2:15)
ln (GDP per capita) 4:506
(2:49)
:189
(:23)
 3:703
( :73)
ln (Public Expenditure)  3:172
( 5:02)
 :239
( :77)
 4:966
( 3:86)
Pupil-Teacher Ratio  :261
( 1:92)
 :050
( :84)
 :259
( 1:47)
Mortality Rate  :168
( 2:27)
 :018
( :54)
 :223
( 2:21)
Developed Country 13:403
(2:96)
 :448
( :22)
19:196
(2:92)
Tertiary enrollment 2000 1:100
(24:70)
R2 0.68 .94 .42
Observations 164 156 164
NOTE. t-statistics in parentheses. * is signicant at the 10% signicance level, ** at
the 5%, and *** at the 1%. Developed Country is a dummy variable that takes on
the value 1 if the country is developed and 0 otherwise. See text for details.
Table 4: The E¤ect of FDI on Average Years of Schooling
OLS IV
FDI per capita  :101
( :33)
:900
(:63)
(FDI per capita)2  :004
( :10)
 :135
( :86)
ln (GDP per capita) :572
(2:82)
:322
(:71)
ln (Public Expenditure)  :011
( :15)
 :071
( :57)
Pupil-Teacher Ratio  :021
( 1:39)
 :020
( 1:31)
Mortality Rate  :044
( 5:22)
 :045
( 5:01)
Developed Country 1:399
(2:75)
1:683
(2:87)
Tertiary enrollment 2000
R2 0.75 0.73
Observations 164 164
NOTE. t-statistics in parentheses. * is signicant at the 10% signicance level, ** at
the 5%, and *** at the 1%. Developed Country is a dummy variable that takes on
the value 1 if the country is developed and 0 otherwise. See text for details.
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Table 5: Optimal FDI Levels: that Maximize Human Capital Variables
OLS Proxy IV
Secondary Education 4.275 3.549 
Tertiary Education 4.397 6.581 4.319
Average Schooling   3.333
NOTE. Entries are optimalFDI levels that maximize each measure of human cap-
ital: secondary education, tertiary education, and average schooling. Simulated values
are based on estimation results (coe¢ cients of FDI and FDI2 from Tables 24.
earlier, since we do not have the lagged value of schooling (in 2000) we could not carry out a proxy variable
estimation for this variable.
5.1 Optimal FDI
Given that the relationship between human capital and FDI is described by the following equation:
dHC = + ^1FDI + ^2FDI2 + ^X
it is possible to nd the optimal FDI,that is, the level of FDI at which one of the human capital variables
is maximized. The maximum HC is attained at FDI which satises:
^1 + 2^2FDI
 = 0
FDI =
 ^1
2^2
which is the rst order condition. Substituting some of our signicant (and meaningful) estimates of ^1
and ^2 from Tables 24 in the above equation, we nd optimal FDI levels under each scenario. These are
described in the following table:
Strikingly, and despite the di¤erent measures of human capital used, and the di¤erent methods employed,
our analyses seem to point to an optimal FDI level around 4 (thousand USD per capita). For example, for
tertiary education, and using the IV approach, the optimal FDI is about 4.32. The following graph plots
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Table 6: Average Human Capital in High FDI and Low FDI Countries
Low FDI High FDI
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Secondary Enrollment 58.8 27.86 84.2 9.00
Tertiary Enrollment 26.1 24.75 45.9 23.13
Average Schooling 12.0 3.21 14.5 2.50
NOTE. LowFDI denes countries (151 in number) for whome the FDI per capita
is below 2 (i.e., 2000 USD), and HighFDI denes (13) countries above that level.
FDI (per capita) levels of the countries in our sample, around a horizontal line at the 4.3 level:
Given our previous estimates, Sweden, for example, seems to have the right level of FDI net ows.
Equally clear from the graph is that many countries cluster at much lower levels of FDI per capita than
the optimalone. If we calculate the simple average human-capital variables for countries with FDI per
capita above and below, say, 2 we nd the following:
Table 6 draw a clear fact: countries with high (above $2,000 per capita) FDI attain higher levels of
schooling under any and every measure of human capital used. On the one hand, this proves the existence
of the optimal FDI point, at least in regards to human capital in the host country. On the other hand,
however, this may point to the possibility that many countries are caught with a low-human-capital-trap,
where the FDI level is not su¢ ciently large to mobilize them to the maximum potential human capital.
6 Concluding Remarks
As a conclusion, we should emphasize the concave, inverted-U shape of the relation between FDI per capita
and human-capital formation. This relationship is clearer in the case of tertiary education, which may reveal
that FDI tends to be skill-biased and raise inequality in most LDCs. There is a clustering of many countries
around a lower-than-optimal level of FDI. We conjecture that some of these countries may be a¤ected by
a low-human-capital trap, as suggested by some of our simulations. Proving the e¤ective existence (or
inexistence) of those traps is an interesting avenue for future research.
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7 Appendix
Countries included in our samples are:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Dem.
Rep. of Congo, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dji-
bouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon,
The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong (SAR China), Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Rep. of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao
P.D.R., Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macao SAR, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao, Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, R.B. de Venezuela, West Bank and Gaza,
Rep. of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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